












ISSN: 2363-9849          
Research Note: Singapore’s “Deradicalisation” Model: Revolution 
– or Evolutions? 
 
Shashi Jayakumara1 
aSenior Fellow; Head, Centre of Excellence for National Security, S. Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies; Nanyang Technological University  
 
Article History 
Received Mar 1, 2021 
Accepted Mar 11, 2021 



















The news of the detention in late November 2020 by Singapore’s Internal Security 
Department (ISD) of a Singaporean citizen (of Protestant faith, and Indian by ethnicity) in 
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Abstract 
The detention in December 2020 by Singapore’s Internal Security Department 
(ISD) of a “far-right” individual, a 16-year-old Singapore citizen of ethnic Indian 
background (and of Protestant faith) who planned to murder Muslims at two 
mosques (imitating Brenton Tarrant’s 2019 attacks in Christ Church) is something 
of a jolt to those who follow radicalization trends in Singapore and Southeast 
Asia. Past detentions of radicalized individuals in Singapore have tended to be of 
ISIS-inspired youths (or, in the earlier phase, members of the Jemaah Islamiah).  
This research note attempts to trace the likely evolutions of Singapore’s 
“deradicalisation” model in response to this striking case. More attention will 
likely have to be paid to “non-ideological factors” especially in cases that involve 
youths. The research note also considers whether the Religious Rehabilitation 
Group, the key player in Singapore’s “deradicalization” enterprise, is necessarily 
the best body equipped to deal with new types of (non-Islamist) radicalization 
cases. At the wider, whole-of-society level, relevant agencies will likely have to 
find ways to reinforce aspects of Singapore’s “resilience model” (in particular, the 
emphasis on tolerance and inter-faith and inter-ethnic harmony) which forms an 
integral part of Singapore’s holistic counter-radicalisation strategy. Time and 
resources will also need to be be devoted to study other forms of extremism, 
including types formerly thought to be confined to the West. It is vital that links 
be forged between researchers across East and West exploring the phenomena of 
new trends in radicalisation, not least because of the possibility that potential 
extremists just embarking on their own trajectories across may well be doing the 
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December 2020 has come as something of a surprise to some observers – especially to those 
who chose to associate extremist activity in Southeast Asia solely violent Islamist groups and 
individuals. The unnamed individual, aged 16 at the time of his detention, was influenced in 
particular by the thought and actions of Brenton Tarrant, who murdered of 51 Muslims at two 
mosques on 15 March 2019 in Christ Church. The youth, imitating Tarrant, planned to kill 
Muslims at two mosques, on the very same day in 2021 – 15 March.2 
The youth appeared to be entirely self-radicalised by online media. He is not known to 
have been part of any milieu or online community either in Asia or the West. A great deal 
which remains unknown about him, but it is clear that a key facet of his radicalisation 
trajectory was his viewing of ISIS propaganda and material showing ISIS atrocities. Two 
incidents that seem to have been particularly germane was material showing execution of 
Ethiopian Christians in Libya by ISIS militants, and (in particular) the attacks in October 
2020 by an ISIS-inspired Tunisian at the Notre-Dame basilica in Nice that left three people 
dead. The youth formed the view that Islam was an existential threat against Christianity, and 
that action was needed to protect his faith. In one of the two manifestoes he penned (both not 
made public, and one unfinished), the youth variously called his planned attacks a 
“massacre”, an “act of vengeance” and a “call for war” against Islam.  
The youth appears to have acted entirely alone: He is not known to have been 
groomed or encouraged online by others, with his family and those close to him completely 
unaware of his plans. 3 He was not delusional; nor does he appear to suffer from mental health 
 
2 Internal Security Department, “Detention of Singaporean Youth Who Intended to Attack Muslims on the 
Anniversary of Christchurch Attacks in New Zealand”, Ministry of Home Affairs, January 27, 2021, 
https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-release/news/detention-of-singaporean-youth-who-intended-to-attack-
muslims-on-the-anniversary-of-christchurch-attacks-in-new-zealand. For some thoughts assembling and 
assessing what is known, see Shashi Jayakumar, “Singapore: The Lure of the Far-Right”, GNET Insights, 
February 2, 2021, https://gnet-research.org/2021/02/02/singapore-the-lure-of-the-far-right/. The paragraphs that 
follow in this introductory section rely on the ISD press statement and on press reporting of a briefing 
subsequently given by ISD to the media. Relevant individual press reports are given further in the footnotes 
below as appropriate. 
3 It would appear that most of the imbibing of online that contributed the radicalization of the youth took place 
from late 2019-2020. It is not known if the advent of COVID-19 (which led to a brief lockdown in Singapore in 
2020, as well as enforced study-from-home arrangements for some time), contributed further to his immersion in 
online material and consequent radicalization. For commentary on the phenomenon of COVID-19 accelerating 
and energizing extremist groups, see Joby Warrick, “Covid-19 pandemic is stoking extremist flames worldwide, 
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issues. He planned his attacks methodically and in a determined fashion, admitting 
subsequently that he knew he would likely either be detained before he could execute his 
plan, or else be successful and killed by the police in the aftermath. He did online 
reconnaissance the two mosques he had targeted, identified his route of travel, planned to 
steal his father’s credit card in order to procure a car on a local car-sharing service, and 
watched a online tutorials on how to drive. In addition, he had made preliminary 
(unsuccessful) efforts to obtain a firearm and also explored making a Triacetone Triperoxide 
(TATP) bomb. Eventually settling on a machete as his weapon of choice (which he was close 
to purchasing when he was detained), he also viewed YouTube videos on the most efficient 
ways to kill with the machete.  
This is the first far-right detention in Singapore, and is also the first case of its type in 
Southeast Asia.4 
The purpose of this research note is to shed light on the likely evolutions of what has 
come to be called (with some degree of oversimplification) Singapore’s “deradicalization” 
model in response to this striking case, which has hitherto mainly had to deal with individuals 
from a radical Islamist background.  
 
Extremism in Singapore: Background 
Beginning in late 2001, members of the Singapore cell of Jemaah Islamiah (JI), the 
key al-Qaeda affiliate in Southeast Asia, began to be detained after their activities (which 





4 There have been incidents of Christians attacking Muslims in Sulawesi and Maluku, Indonesia, but only in the 
context of communal conflict with broader structural drivers, during which violent acts were committed by both 
sides (I thank Cameron Sumpter for enlightenment on this issue). For a brief backgrounder, see Keisyah Aprilia, 
“How a Christian-Muslim Conflict in Eastern Indonesia Birthed the MIT Militant Group”, BenarNews, March 
12, 2020, https://www.benarnews.org/english/news/special-reports/id-mit-terrorism-pt2-12032020134008.html. 
Violence against the ethnic Rohingya in Myanmar committed by the members of Buddhist majority (with, most 
observers agree, the government to some degree complicit) in recent years has deep-seated cultural and historical 
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discovered and interdicted.5 Senior Muslims clerics came together in 2002-3, concerned by 
the JI arrests, and convinced (in the face of considerable scepticism within the Muslim 
community) that the Muslim community in Singapore had to take some ownership of the 
issue.6 This became the nucleus of the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG). The RRG 
counsellors attempted to engage with JI individuals and getting to the roots of their radical 
thought.  
A second distinct wave of detentions can be discerned from 2007: self-radicalised 
individuals influenced by social media. The number of detentions began to accelerate from 
2014 when individuals began to be detained for adherence to the Islamic State in Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS).  
All told, 129 Singaporeans have been issued orders under Singapore’s Internal 
Security Act (ISA; which provides for detention without trial) since 2002.7 88 were served 
with a detention order (DO) and 41 were served with a Restriction Order (RO), which 
imposes certain restrictions on the individual.8 Of the 88 who were detained, 68 have been 
released on restriction orders (RO) after counselling by the RRG.9 Overall, the ISA/RRG 
approach has been by and large successful particularly for the earlier generation of detainees; 
the overall “success rate” (those who have been released) for the 40 JI or JI-linked individuals 
detained is 88%.10 
In recent years, and especially from 2014, the number of detentions of JI members has 
tailed off. RRG counsellors have attempted to engage with self-radicalised individuals 
detained by ISD, several of whom attempted to join ISIS in Syria, or who were preparing to 
 
5 For background, see Ministry of Home Affairs, “The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrests and the Threat of Terrorism”, 
Ministry of Home Affairs, January 7, 2003, https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/others/english.pdf. 
6 Shashi Jayakumar, Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future (London: ICSR, King’s College 
London, 2020), 6-7. https://icsr.info/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/ICSR-Report-Deradicalisation-in-Singapore-
Past-Present-and-Future.pdf 
7 This number includes individuals from the JI. 
8 An individual issued with an RO is not allowed to change his place of residence, employment or travel out of 
the country without approval; other conditions as determined by the Internal Security Department may be 
stipulated. If further progress is made post-release, the RO can be allowed to lapse.   
9 These updated figures given, released recently by the authorities, should be preferred to those given by the 
author in Deradicalisation in Singapore. For the identities of detained individuals, see 
https://www.linkedin.com/posts/activity-6704275592663097344-PmuS. 
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commit acts of violence in Singapore.11 Officials have acknowledged that it is in some ways 
more difficult to reach self-radicalised individuals. The success rate (meaning the number of 
individuals who have been released) for self-radicalised individuals detained since 2007 stood 




RRG now has over 40 counsellors, and includes women counsellors as in the age of ISIS, 
women are for the first time being detained for radicalisation.13 It is run – indeed important to 
be seen to be run – as an initiative by the Muslim community, with some government 
assistance. 
It is important for to consider the extent to which RRG needs to evolve – and whether 
in fact it needs to evolve – in the light of the detention of the right-wing youth. The RRG is 
staffed with Muslim clerics. There is no sign of the RRG being expanded (for example, 
staffed with Christian religious leaders) to rehabilitate individuals like the youth under 
consideration.  
 
11 See for example Yvonne Lim, “Self radicalised teens: One detained, another arrested”, TODAY, May 24, 2015,  
https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/two-sporean-teens-detained-under-internal-security-act. Separately, a 
very small number are known to have made the journey to Syria to join ISIS. None of those who made the 
journey has returned, and there is reason to believe that most have been killed. Ministry of Home Affairs, 
“Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2019”, Ministry of Home Affairs, January 22, 2019, 
https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-release/news/singapore-terrorism-threat-assessment-report-2019. 
12 Seow, “Self-radicalised people harder to rehabilitate: Shanmugam”. There are only two known cases of 
recidivism in the history of Singapore’s rehabilitation efforts. Both were self-radicalised individuals. See 
Jayakumar, Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future, 19 & 89. 
13 Zhaki Abdullah, “ISD adjusts approach to rehabilitation as more young people pick up terrorist ideology”, 
Channel NewsAsia, February 3, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/isd-rehabilitation-
approach-adjusted-youth-terrorist-ideology-14102274. Women counsellors needed (beginning from 2005) to 
engage the wives and children of JI detainees. (See Nur Irfani Binte Saripi, “Religious Rehabilitation Group: 
Female Volunteers Ten Years On”, RSIS, May 15, 2015, https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/icpvtr/co15118-religious-rehabilitation-group-female-volunteers-ten-years-on/#.YDW44ZMzblw). 
In the era of ISIS, with Singaporean women themselves being detained for radicalisation, female counsellors 
have directly engaged female detainees. Chong Zi Liang, “Women have important role to play in countering 
radical ideology, say experts”, Straits Times, May 12, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/women-
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Instead, there is some sense of the Christian community needing to take ownership, 
much like the Muslim community did in 2002-3.14 For the present case, it is known that the 
youth will be given counselling by Christian religious leaders. 15 But it is too early to tell 
whether this will be done on a case by case basis, or whether an RRG analogue staffed by 
Christian counsellors will need to be set up. RRG counsellors have been quick to make it 
known that they would be prepared to offer advice.16 This sharing of experiences may well be 
needed. The RRG (together with mosques) has in recent years major attempt has been made 
to reach out to younger, impressionable individuals who might be lured in to radical thinking 
through ISIS propaganda encountered on social media and chatrooms; it has been recognised 
that this outreach needs to be done online too in order to reach out to a younger, more-tech 




While considering the present ring-wing youth, it is worth bearing in mind recent trends in 
radicalisation in Singapore. In the period 2015-2019, seven youths between the ages of 16 and 
19 were investigated for Islamist radicalisation. Before 2014, the youngest individual dealt 
 
14 While it is still early days, it is not altogether clear if all leaders within the extremely diverse Christian 
community in Singapore are prepared to recognise that the potential seriousness of the detention and its 
implications. See the thought-provoking (and by no means unanimous) remarks of various individuals and 
Christian leaders in Chua Mui Hoong, “S'pore teen detained under ISA: Wake-up call for Christian community”, 
Straits Times, February 5, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/wake-up-call-for-christian-community. 
One is reminded of the consternation within the Muslim community in Singapore in the early period c.2002-3 
following the JI arrests– many Singaporean Muslims had difficulty believing that the JI extremists came from 
their community. 
15 Fabian Koh, “16-year-old detained under ISA for planning mosque attacks to receive religious, psychological 
counselling”, Straits Times, 27 January, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/16-year-old-detained-
under-isa-for-planning-mosque-attacks-to-receive-religious. 
16 Abdullah, “ISD adjusts approach to rehabilitation as more young people pick up terrorist ideology”. 
17 Ministry of Home Affairs, “16th Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG) Seminar – Speech by Mr K 
Shanmugam, Minister for Home Affairs and Minister for Law”, Ministry of Home Affairs, November 24, 2020, 
https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/speeches/news/16th-religious-rehabilitation-group-seminar-speech-by-mr-k-
shanmugam-minister-for-home-affairs-and-minister-for-law; Faris Mokhtar, “Essential to engage millennial 
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with was 20 years old.18 It appears that the recent, pro-ISIS cases are quicker to radicalise 
compared to the earlier generation of individuals detained. Officials have noted that formerly, 
it used to take around 22 months for individuals to become radicalised. But in the ISIS era, 
this has been shortened to nine months.19  
One apparent parallel with the present case under consideration has to do with the 
right-wing youth’s connection to his religious faith. Several of the recent pro-ISIS cases 
investigated appear to know less about their religion when compared to the earlier generation 
of JI extremists.20 One knowledgeable source, commenting on recent pro-ISIS youth cases in 
Singapore, has observed that some of the radicalised youths faced stressors in their lives and 
that an infatuation with ISIS was in some ways a “substitute activity” that created “new 
sources of satisfaction” or which distracted from the original stressor. In other cases, 
involvement with ISIS ideology formed part of a coping strategy that helped the individual 
avoid facing his/her problems realistically.21 
While it is unwise to speculate on potential parallels with the right-wing youth, there 
has not in the information released by the authorities been the suggestion that he was a deeply 
religious individual before the beginning of his radicalisation journey. It is not known if the 
youth was active in any church. What is known is that the youth was fascinated by violence22, 
sought gory and violent material first in online sites and forums, and that it the course of this 
 
18 Wong Pei Ting, “ISD adjusts rehab approach to evolving threat landscape as more youths, women among 
terror suspects”, TODAY, 3 February, 2021, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/isd-adjusts-rehab-approach-
evolving-threat-landscape-more-youths-women-among-terror. 
19 Valerie Koh, “Time taken for people to be radicalised has been shortened: Shanmugam”, TODAY, 14 
September, 2017, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/time-taken-people-be-radicalised-has-been-shortened-
shanmugam. 
20 See the case study of “Daniel” described in Abdullah, “ISD adjusts approach to rehabilitation as more young 
people pick up terrorist ideology”.  
21 Bridget Robert, “Why Do Youths Join Terrorist Groups? A Psychological Study of At-Risk and Radicalised 
Youths in Singapore”, Home Team Journal (9), (February 2020): 78 – 85 at 83, 
https://www.mha.gov.sg/docs/default-source/default-document-library/ht-journal-no-9.pdf. 
22 One of the manifestos written by the youth evinces this: he notes that that “violence should never be solved 
with peace”, because peace, while “moral”, is “nowhere near effective” as violence. Internal Security 
Department, “Detention of Singaporean Youth Who Intended to Attack Muslims on the Anniversary of 
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search that he came across ISIS propaganda in late 2019.23 The material he viewed and 
information he imbibed (concerning the Nice attack in 2020 and ISIS atrocities in Libya) 
appear to have contributed to grievance against Islam, strengthened his identification with his 
own faith, and identification with historical figures who were glorified by the far-right for 
defending Christendom against Islam.24 
As noted above, counselling by Christian leaders will be attempted. Notwithstanding 
the youth’s Protestant faith, on the basis of what is known and what has been sketched out 
above, it is not certain that religious-based “deradicalization” should be prioritised. 
Unsurprisingly, ISD has stated that the youth will undergo psychological counselling that will 
address his propensity for violence.25 Psychological counselling for radicalised detainees is 
not new: psychologists from the Ministry of Home Affairs have for some considerable time 
worked with detainees as part of the overall rehabilitation approach.26 
In shedding light on aspects of the proposed rehabilitative approach for the youth, the 
authorities have also elaborated to an extent on the evolution of the overall framework for 
rehabilitation.  While priority is still given to addressing the ideological misconceptions 
(presumably including faulty understandings of religious tenets) leading to radicalism, 
attention is also being paid to “non-ideological factors”, in particular for youth.27 Besides 
attention paid to youths’ sense of belonging and identity, emphasis is also being placed on 
critical-thinking skills.  There appears to be a twofold aim in this: these skills will help youths 
 
23 Aqil Haziq Mahmud, “16-year-old Singaporean detained under ISA after planning to attack Muslims at 2 
mosques” Channel NewsAsia, January 27, 2021, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/16-year-old-
singaporean-detained-isa-planned-attack-2-mosques-14052400. 
24 Several of these figures feature on Brenton Tarrant’s rifle. Zakir Hussain, “Teen ISA detention: Rejecting 
incendiary material a must to avert far-right terror”, Straits Times, January 27, 2021, 
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/far-right-isa-detainee-rejecting-incendiary-material-a-must-to-avert-far-
right-terror. 
25 Daryl Choo, “16-year-old S’porean who made ‘detailed plans’ to attack 2 mosques in Woodlands detained 
under ISA”, TODAY, January 28, 2021, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/16-year-old-sporean-who-
made-detailed-plans-attack-2-mosques-woodlands-detained-under-isa. 
26 Jayakumar, Deradicalisation in Singapore: Past, Present and Future, 9-10. The psychological counselling 
sessions are distinct from RRG sessions with detainees. 
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discern radical rhetoric online, and also help them build mental resilience that will help them 
cope with life stressors.28 
What can be discerned from the above is not a sea-change but a subtle, and already 
ongoing, shift in emphasis of parts of the rehabilitation process – in particular, the 
psychological aspect. An important facet of this change in emphasis is helping youth develop 
pro-social habits, making them realise that they are part of the community, and instilling the 
understanding that they need to contribute to others’ needs.  As one knowledgeable 
commentator has observed in discussing pro-ISIS youth cases, “The end goal is essentially to 
provide the youth with an opportunity to lead a productive and fulfilling life in the community 




Within the range of psychological interventions to be attempted, one aspect stands out. ISD 
has made it known that, besides assigning a counsellor from the Christian community to the 
right-wing youth, a mentor will also engage the youth. The disclosure of a mentoring 
programme focusing on youth cases (which began in 2016) is significant. The aim behind 
mentoring is to provide a positive influence and role model and keeping the youth focused on 
pro-social goals, with the hope bring that these can play a role in mitigating the risk of 
recidivism.30  
At least some of the mentors for pro-ISIS detainees have been members of the RRG 
secretariat.31 It must be considered unlikely that the mentor will come from the RRG, which is 
staffed by Muslim clerics. But whatever the background of the individual or individuals 
 
28 Wong, “ISD adjusts rehab approach to evolving threat landscape as more youths, women among terror 
suspects”. 
29 Robert, “Why Do Youths Join Terrorist Groups? A Psychological Study of At-Risk and Radicalised Youths in 
Singapore”: 78 – 85 at 84. 
30 Wong, “ISD adjusts rehab approach to evolving threat landscape as more youths, women among terror 
suspects”. 
31 Hariz Baharudin, “ISD adjusts its approach to rehabilitation as those dealt with for terror-linked conduct gets 
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chosen, the mentoring itself will likely not be purely ad-hoc, but presumably draw on 
experiences and existing practices from the rehabilitation framework.32 ISD case officers have 
been known to interact with detainees in order to give offer social interaction and support, 
with this interaction continuing after release from detention, with the view being that this 
helps in the reintegration process and reduces the risk of re-radicalisation.33 Separately, in a 
different context, case workers from the Inter-Agency Aftercare Group (ACG; on which see 
below) have in the past acted as mentors (it appears in an informal way) for the children of 
detainees who lacked a father figure.34 
What has been discussed above concerns religious and psychological aspects of 
rehabilitation and their evolutions. A third plank, which the authorities place just as much 
emphasis on, is social rehabilitation. For radicalised individuals who are Muslim, some of the 
social rehabilitation aspect is overseen by the ACG, formed in February 2002, which is a 
voluntary grouping of organisations from the Muslim community. ACG volunteers have a 
role in seeing to the needs of family and children of detainees, the group provides counselling 
and financial support for the families of detainees (and where needed, assists family members 
in finding employment). Following release, ACG case workers keep in touch with the former 
detainee and family. This is an important part social reintegration.  
The ACG may not be required in the case of the right-wing youth, but aspects of social 
reintegration and the aftercare approach will be deployed. As part of the rehabilitation 
 
32 Mentoring is of course well-known as forming one plank within diversionary approaches tried elsewhere, 
particularly in the West. A case in point is what has become known as the “Aarhus Model”, named after the city 
in Denmark where mentoring (together with other disengagement approaches involving schools, social services 
and the police) has been used. The approach and variations of it have been used elsewhere in Denmark and 
further afield. Individuals connected with the Aarhus model, including its mentors, have been to Singapore in 
recent years and shared their experiences at seminars and workshops. It would be premature, however, to suggest 
(in the absence of information from the Singapore authorities) that there has been a conscious borrowing. For an 
example of mentoring already being used in Singapore in another context, at-risk youth in the pre-criminal 
space, (where learning lessons could well be drawn when attempting to address new forms of extremism), see 
Ministry of Social and Family Development, “Two New Initiatives for More Effective Guidance And 
Rehabilitation Of  At-Risk Youth”, Ministry of Social and Family Development, August 13, 2020, 
https://www.msf.gov.sg/media-room/Pages/Two-New-Initiatives-for-More-Effective-Guidance-and-
Rehabilitation-of-At-Risk-Youth.aspx. 
33 Wong, “ISD adjusts rehab approach to evolving threat landscape as more youths, women among terror 
suspects”. 
34 Zakir Hussain and Abdul Halim bin Kader (eds.), Inter-Agency Aftercare Group: Fostering Social 
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process, the youth will be allowed family visits (these were also allowed during the initial 
investigation period, which is exceptional, as visits are not usually allowed in this phase), and 
arrangements are being made for him to continue his education.35 This is of course logical, 
but it should additionally be observed that in some cases involving pro-ISIS youth, where a 
detained youth has continued his education, this seems to have had the effect of boosting 
esteem and supports the overall rehabilitation process.36   
Despite what might on the surface seem to be alien or startling aspects of the thought 
of the right-wing youth, the rehabilitative approach likely to be attempted will not necessarily 
(on the basis of what is known) be a great departure from past practice, and it is unsurprising 
that authorities have made it known at the same time as news of the detention had broken that 
adjustments have been made in the rehabilitative approach over the years, to deal especially 
with youth cases.37 New individuals (away from organisations like the ACG and RRG) may 
need to be found to engage the right-wing youth, but there may well be certain conceptual 
strands running through his thought processes which counsellors, mentors and psychologists 





The various facets of the Singapore rehabilitation approach come together to form an 
approach that is more complex than simple “deradicalization”, although this shorthand has 
often been used by commentators. The holistic approach for individuals mirrors changes that 
have been taking place in Singapore’s plural and multi-ethnic society. There have for some 
time been efforts to reinforce cohesion and resilience, and interfaith dialogue.38 These, when 
 
35 Koh, “16-year-old detained under ISA for planning mosque attacks to receive religious, psychological 
counselling”. 
36 See the case study of “Daniel” described in Abdullah, “ISD adjusts approach to rehabilitation as more young 
people pick up terrorist ideology”.  
37 Abdullah, “ISD adjusts approach to rehabilitation as more young people pick up terrorist ideology”. 
38 For an overview, see Centre for Liveable Cities, Urban Systems Studies: Religious Harmony in Singapore: 
Spaces, Practices and Communities (Singapore: CLC Publications, 2020), https://www.clc.gov.sg/docs/default-
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taken together, form what might be called Singapore’s counter-radicalisation approach. For 
some considerable time now, this approach has been underpinned by the resilience narrative, 
and the ability of the diverse groups in Singapore, based on bonds formed, to collectively 
withstand shocks and not descend into mutual distrust (say, in the aftermath of a terrorist 
incident carried out by members of one particular ethnic or religious group).39 Under their 
broad penumbra of these efforts, there appear to be new directions forming that bear 
mentioning.  
There is now a pronounced emphasis on cyber hygiene, social media literacy, critical 
thinking, and pro-social goals. These have not arisen simply within the context of counter-
radicalisation efforts. Disinformation (be it state-sponsored subversion efforts, or other forms 
of fake news which can also undermine social resilience) have been much-discussed in socio-
political circles and in public discourse. The echo-chambers that disinformation can lead to 
are, conceptually, is not altogether dissimilar from those seen in the trajectory of radicalised 
individuals. Both can undermine tolerance for other peoples, and of other points of view.40  
Early intervention means reaching upstream, with schools taking the lead in initiatives 
in promote critical thinking, information literacy cyber wellness.41 These initiatives parallel 
efforts those on the counter-radicalisation track, with ISD working with schools to hold 
workshops dealing with radicalisation and extremism. Other organisations work cooperatively 
in this space: the  RRG also conducts outreach activities such as seminars aimed at students 
 
39 This is understandable, given the underlying risk of social faultlines breaking out in ways that the authorities 
might not be able to completely control; but equally it should be noted that the authorities have been keen to 
emphasise the regional terror threat posed by various ISIS-linked groups in recent years. See Ministry of Home 
Affairs, “Singapore Terrorism Threat Assessment Report 2017”, Ministry of Home Affairs, June 1, 2017, 
https://www.mha.gov.sg/newsroom/press-release/news/singapore-terrorism-threat-assessment-report-2017. 
40 As government officials have repeatedly observed : see for example Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Edited 
Transcript of Opening Address by Minister for Foreign Affairs Dr Vivian Balakrishnan at the 10th Asia-Pacific 
Programme for Senior National Security Officers on 11 April 2016, 9am at the Marina Mandarin”, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, April, 16, 2016, https://www.mfa.gov.sg/Newsroom/Press-Statements-Transcripts-and-
Photos/2016/04/Edited-Transcript-of-Opening-Address-by-Minister-for-Foreign-Affairs-Dr-Vivian-
Balakrishnan-at-the-1. 
41 Lianne Chia, “Thriving rather than surviving: Teaching students how to spot fake news”, Channel NewsAsia, 
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and the youth. Counsellors have attended workshops to spot signs of radicalisation.42 While 
there is presumably a mechanism for reporting of cases of concern, the exact modality is not 
known. But the overall approach is to keep matters unsecuritised as far as possible.43 It is 
known that in a small number of cases where Muslim schoolboys who showed radical 
inclinations, concerned family members approached RRG counsellors who were able to 
reshape the outlook of the youths.  RRG does not report cases like these to the authorities 
unless there is a serious concern, with ISD also observing that individuals found to be at the 
early stage of radicalisation may be referred to counselling without the need for detention. 44 
Presumably, this approach is also mirrored in schools.  
It remains to sketch out avenues for further inquiry.  
Officials in Singapore have been keen to stress that extremism does not emanate solely 
from one religion. Clearly, researchers and practitioners will need in the coming years to 
devote time and resources to the study of non-Islamist, and also now non-Christian based 
forms of extremism, including those which have their roots in exclusivist strands of Hindu 
and Buddhist thought. These studies of these will necessarily need to encompass not the 
ideological journeys of radicalised individuals, but extend to broader considerations of 
exclusivist thought that can provide a conducive backdrop for the perpetration of violence.   
Separately, individuals who are not driven by any particular ideology but who engage 
in meaning-seeking behaviour, and in pursuit of their goals may be prepared to engage in 
violent acts, may well become more common. In 2016 for example news broke of precisely 
such an individual, an ethnic Chinese Singapore citizen seeking to escape from personal 
 
42 Fabian Koh, “Parliament: Schools and institutes of higher learning among targets of youth outreach to combat 
radicalisation”, Straits Times, February 16, 2021, https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/parliament-
schools-and-institutes-of-higher-learning-among-targets-of-youth.  
43 ISD is not the only actor when it comes to interventions and outreach. NGOs and government agencies 
concerned with social support and resilience, as well as facilitating  inter-racial and inter-religious dialogue, also 
conduct a range of outreach activities in and out of school settings. Koh, “Parliament: Schools and institutes of 
higher learning among targets of youth outreach to combat radicalisation”.  
44 Toh Yong Chuan, “Early counselling by Muslim scholars turned two teenage boys away from radicalism”, 
Straits Times, June 24, 2017, https://www.straitstimes.com/politics/early-counselling-by-muslim-scholars-
turned-two-teenage-boys-away-from-radicalism; Ministry of Home Affairs, “Singapore Terrorism Threat 
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difficulties, who attempted to join Kurdish militia to fight against ISIS.45 This particular 
course of action - seeking to take up arms against ISIS – is of course much better known from 
cases in the West (the Singaporean individual would have been the first Southeast Asian to 
engage in such an act if he had been successful).  
What this may mean is that all concerned with these issues in Singapore (and indeed 
Southeast Asia) may consider the possibility that modes of extreme thinking and behaviour 
evident further afield, in the West, could find fertile ground within the minds of 
impressionable young people in Singapore and Southeast Asia. On the face of it, it might 
seem inherently likely, given that many of these movements in the West have specific 
concerns or draw on distinct historical narratives, seemingly sharing little in common with 
individuals halfway across the world. Still, these possibilities should not be discarded. The 
youth detained forming the focus of the present study was “right-wing” but of a different 
make-up to the individual he idolised, Brenton Tarrant. Tarrant was a white supremacist. The 
detained youth, of Indian ethnicity, would presumably not therefore have shared much in 
common with Tarrant, but the fact remains they inhabited the same mindspace. The youth 
subscribed for example to the same ideas Tarrant did, concerning the Great Replacement, and 
the idea that Muslim fertility rates would eventually mean the displacement of Christians.46  
Trends when it comes to individuals prepared to engage in violence now being seen in 
the West - Incels, or individuals with mixed or unstable ideologies to name just two 
possibilities – may well be mirrored in Asia or Southeast Asia in future. Only time will tell.  
There is the possibility that, besides inhabiting a shared mindspace, right wing 
extremists across East and West seek actively to confer (say, across fora or chatgroups) and 
share their thinking and ideas, however incongruous (given differences in culture, outlook, 
and historical narratives that feed grievances) these contacts might seem to be. Such contact 
does not seem to have been present in the case of the right-wing youth in Singapore, but it 
cannot be ruled out in future.  
 
45 See “From migrant to new citizen and now ISA detainee: Wang Yuandongyi’s unusual journey”, TODAY, 
March 16, 2016, https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/migrant-new-citizen-and-now-isa-detainee-wang-
yuandongyis-unusual-journey”,  
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If indeed time and experience bear out this two theses: that Asia “lags” the west in 
radicalisation trends, and that “right wing” extremists across East and West may form 
connections with each other going beyond just a loose set of ideas held in common  – then 
sharing of intellectual capital between researchers across East and West will be extremely 
important. Fora should be devised experts familiar with the most recent developments when it 
comes to right wing or other “new” forms of extremism in the West to share their knowledge. 
Not all might be directly transferable, given differing norms, cultural and religious contexts, 
but this discourse might at least help both sides understand better avenues for further research. 
The need for these collaborations is increasingly pressing, given (the contention of the present 
writer) that all kinds of individuals might in time be radicalised, or radicalise themselves, 
even in countries with seemingly predictable trends (based on recent history) of radicalisation 
such as Singapore.   
As for Singapore itself: its rehabilitation model will have to continue in its evolutions 
in order to cope with what may be about to come. And this can only be successful if work 
done at the larger, whole of society level succeeds. This matters not just for Singapore, but, 
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